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I. Introduction 
 
In 2001, a twenty-day sit-in at Harvard University brought the living-wage debate 
to the forefront of American consciousness. After a six-month study, the Harvard 
Committee on Employment and Contracting Policies, a 19 member committee of faculty, 
staff, administrators and students that had been appointed by Harvard’s president as a 
result of the discussions to end the sit-in, recommended giving raises to the university’s 
lowest paid employees and relying more on collective bargaining in the future to assure 
that the wages paid by subcontractors did not undercut local union wage scales.1 A three-
day sit-in at the University of Connecticut that related to the living wage issue also 
yielded a substantive victory for campus workers. The protesters there generated an 
almost two-dollar increase in wages, as well as substantial improvement in benefits for 
many of the university’s workers.2 Collectively these struggles represent a new 
battleground in American higher education.  
The growth of living wage movements on almost one hundred campuses reflects 
the large variation in the wages paid to college and university staff across the country.3 
There are many potential explanations for these salary differences, including differences 
in local cost of living and differences in the resources that the academic institutions have 
available to pay faculty and staff salaries. One other possible explanation is the influence 
of staff unions. Previous studies of the impact of unions on salaries in academia have 
focused on faculty unions and have concluded that faculty unions have increased the 
                                                 
1 Chronicle of Higher Education (January 11, 2002) 
2 Chronicle of Higher Education (May 25, 2001) 
3 Martin Van Der Werf (August 3, 2001) 
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salaries of their members relative to the salaries of faculty at academic institutions in 
which faculty are not covered by collective bargaining agreements by at best a small 
percentage amount.4 There have been no studies, however, of the impact of collective 
bargaining on staff salaries in higher education.  
Our paper addresses this issue. After providing some background data on the 
number of blue-collar and white-collar employees covered by collective bargaining 
agreements at American higher education institutions, we use data from a 1997-1998 
study on the costs of staffing in higher education conducted by the Association of Higher 
Education Facilities Officers (APPA) and other sources to estimate models that explain 
the variation in academic institutions’ salaries for a number of narrowly defined blue 
collar and white collar occupational groups that are employed by the academic 
institutions’ facilities divisions.5 Of primary interest to us, is the extent to which the 
salaries of academic staff covered by collective bargaining agreements exceed the 
salaries of otherwise comparable academic staff that are not covered by such agreements.  
II. Background Data 
Table 1 presents data on the employment levels of blue-collar and white-collar 
staff members employed in American higher education in the mid 1990s, as well as the 
percentage of each group that was covered by a collective bargaining agreement. The 
percentage of blue-collar employees represented by staff unions, 42.8%, is much larger 
than the percentage of white-collar employees, 23.4%, represented by staff unions. 
Because there are many more white-collar employees, in the aggregate about 27.7% of 
                                                 
4 See, for example, Javad Ashrat (2000), Debra Barbezat (1989), Randall Kessering (1991) and Daniel I. 
Rees (1993). James Monks (2000) estimates union impacts of 7 to 14%, which are larger than the estimates 
found in other studies,  
5 The acronym APPA is derived from the earlier name of the organization, the Association of Physical 
Plant Administrators of Universities and Colleges. 
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staff at American colleges and universities were covered by union contracts in the mid 
1990s. 
 The salary and collective bargaining coverage data used in our study come from 
the APPA’s 1997-1998 Comparative Costs and Staffing Report for College and 
University Faculties.6 This data set provided information on salary levels and collective 
bargaining coverage for 47 narrowly defined occupations at 193 American and Canadian 
colleges, universities and elementary and secondary schools. We restricted our attention 
to American higher education institutions that could be classified as Research, Doctoral, 
Masters, Baccalaureate, or Associate (2-year) institutions.7 The sample that we used 
ultimately consisted of 163 institutions 
 Table 2 presents the breakdown of the institutions in our sample by Carnegie 
classification and by form of control. Public institutions constitute the majority of the 
institutions in each Carnegie category in our sample, except for the Baccalaureate 
category.  
 We restrict our attention to the 9 occupations for which at least 115 institutions in 
the sample reported both an occupational salary level and whether the employees in the 
occupation were covered by a collective bargaining agreement. Table 3 shows the 
difference in the mean annual salaries of unionized and non-unionized employees for 
each occupation, as well as the ratio of the mean salary in an occupation for employees 
that were covered by union contracts to the mean salary in an occupation for employees 
                                                 
6 We are grateful to Joseph Lally, Director of Business Operations for Cornell’s Facilities Services 
Division, for granting us access to these data, under the condition that we not identify the specific 
institutions that participated in the survey. 
7 Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching (1994) In addition to excluding Canadian and 
elementary and secondary institutions, we also excluded specialized United States institutions such as 
seminaries and conservatories. 
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that were not covered by a union contract. In each occupation, employees covered by a 
union contract earned considerably more than employees not covered by a contract, with 
the raw differentials in the means salaries varying across occupations from 23 to 42 
percent. The differentials were largest in the skilled trades. Salaries for custodial workers, 
the group of employees that have been the focus of the living wage debate on many 
campuses were the lowest in the group and the unionized custodial workers in the sample 
earned about 35 percent more on average than custodial workers at academic institutions 
that were not covered by a collective bargaining agreement. 
III. Estimating the Union/Nonunion Salary Advantage of Unionized Academic Staff 
 The estimated differences in the salaries of academic staff covered by and not 
covered by union contracts reported in table 3 are raw differences that do not control for 
characteristics of the institutions, or the areas in which the institutions are located, that 
might be expected to influence staff salaries independent of unionization. For example, if 
academic institutions whose employees were organized also had greater financial 
resources, or were located in higher cost of living areas, than institutions whose 
employees were not organized, one would expect to observe the former paying higher 
salaries than the latter, even if unionization per se had no effect on the salaries of staff at 
academic institutions. To estimate, whether staff unions to influence salaries, it is 
necessary to control for the other characteristics of the institutions that might be expected 
to influence salaries. 
To accomplish this, we estimate staff salary equations, by occupation, of the 
form: 
 Log (Wi) = a0 + a1Ui + a2Yi + a3Zi + ei 
 4
  In the equation Wi is the annual salary paid to a staff member in an occupation at 
the academic institution, Ui is a categorical variable indicating whether the particular 
occupation is unionized at the institution, Yi is a vector of categorical variables indicating 
the Carnegie classification of the institution (two-year colleges are the omitted category), 
Zi is a vector of other variables that vary across institutions and are expected to influence 
staff salaries, and the ei are random error terms. Because the dependent variable is the 
logarithm of salaries, the interpretation of the estimate of the coefficient a1 is that it is the 
estimated percentage by which the salaries of staff in institutions with collective 
bargaining for the occupation exceed the salaries of staff at institutions without collective 
bargaining for the occupation, after controlling for the other factors expected to influence 
salaries.8 
 We include in the Yi a set of variables that influence the resources that the 
academic institutions have at their command out of which to pay the salaries of staff. 
These include the logarithm of the institution’s endowment per student (LENDOW), the 
logarithm of its average undergraduate tuition (LTUIT) and, for public institutions, the 
logarithm of its state and local government appropriation per student (LAPP).9 In our 
basic specification, we also include the logarithm of the average salary that the institution 
pays its full professors (LSAL), under the assumption that this probably represents the 
best single measure of the financial capacity of the institution.  Also included in this 
vector, to control for differences in cost of living or wage levels across areas, is the 
                                                 
8 More precisely, the estimated union/nonunion salary differential is given by  ( e – 1)(100) 1a
9  For public institutions this is a weighted average of its in-state and out-of-state tuitions, with the weights 
depending upon the fraction of its students that come from each category. 
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logarithm of the mean salary of custodians in the city in which the academic institution is 
located (LMEAN). When an institution was not located in a city for which we had mean 
custodian salary data, the mean custodian wage in the state was substituted. Finally, 
included in this vector is the logarithm of the average math and verbal SAT 75th 
percentile score for entering freshmen at the institution (LSAT). This variable, as well as 
the Carnegie category variables were included to see if the “selectivity” of an academic 
institution, or its institutional type, influences the salary of its staff, once we have 
controlled for its financial resources.  
 Table 4 presents the estimates of our logarithm of occupational salary equations. 
Looking first at the effect of being covered by a collective bargaining contract on the 
salary of staff, for 6 of the 9 occupations union coverage is associated, other factors held 
constant, with higher salaries, with the estimated differentials being in the range of 10 to 
17 percent. The differentials are the largest for several of the occupations that historically 
have been heavily unionized nationwide in the building trades. Relevant to the living 
wage debate, we do observe that unionized custodians appear to earn about 10 percent 
more than nonunionized custodians at academic institutions, other factors held constant 
 Turning next to the financial variables, staff members’ salaries are clearly 
strongly related to the proxy for the cost of living or alternative wages in the area. For 
most occupations, one cannot reject the hypothesis that a 1 percent increase in the 
average wage of custodians in the area is associated with a 1 percent increase in the 
academic staff members’ salaries.  
 Salaries of staff members at American colleges and universities are also clearly 
related to the salaries paid to full professors employed at their institutions. Interestingly, 
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the magnitude of the relationship appears to be strongest for the one white-collar 
occupation represented in our sample, administrative secretary. Once we control for the 
salaries paid to full professors, we find little evidence that knowledge of the financial 
picture facing the institution, as measured by its endowment per student, its average 
tuition level or, for publics, its per student state and local government appropriation level, 
influence its staff members’ salaries10 
 Other factors held constant, including the financial and unionization variables, for 
several categories of staff, the Carnegie category of the institution in which they are 
employed is a statistically significant determinant of their salaries. In particular, 
administrative secretaries, custodial employees, and locksmiths employed at 2-year 
institutions appear to earn 12 to 25 percent more than their counterparts who are 
employed at baccalaureate, masters, doctoral or research institutions. Put perhaps another 
way, 2-year institutions appear to be the least elitist; the faculty/staff salary differential is 
lowest at these institutions.11 Finally, the selectivity of an institution’s undergraduate 
students, as measured by their SAT scores, is not related to the salaries of staff in these 
occupations. 
   
IV.  Testing for the Sensitivity of Our Findings to Alternative Specifications 
 Our primary concern is the effect of unionization of staff employees at academic 
institutions on the salaries of those staff employees.  Table 5 summarizes the results of 
                                                 
10 As we indicate in the next section, we also estimated models that excluded the logarithm of full 
professors’ average salary. However, in these models the measures we included of the institutions’ 
financial wealth- endowment per student, tuition and state and local appropriations per student - again 
never proved to be positively related to the salaries of staff in an occupation 
11 For the other occupations, two-year colleges also appear to pay higher salaries, ceteris paribus, than the 
other categories of institutions but the estimated differentials are usually not statistically significantly 
different from zero. 
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additional econometric modeling we conducted to investigate the sensitivity of the 
estimated union coefficient to the variables included in the analyses and to the 
econometric methods we utilized. Row A of table 5 simply repeats the estimated union 
coefficients that are reported in table 4. 
 A key explanatory variable underlying table 4 was the logarithm of the average 
salary of full professors at the institution. One can easily argue that this variable should 
be treated as endogenous and that including it in the model may bias the estimated union 
coefficient. To see if the inclusion of the full professor salary variable mattered, we 
reestimated our equation excluding this variable from the analyses and the estimated 
union coefficients are found in row B of table 5.  The exclusion of the full professor 
salary variable from the right-hand side of the equation leads to slightly higher estimated 
union/nonunion differentials, with the statistically significant coefficients now ranging 
from 13 to 21 percent. 
 The estimates presented in table 4 treat each occupational equation as 
independent. They ignore the fact that there may be some omitted institutional level 
variables that influence the salaries of staff commonly in all occupations. For example, 
the union/nonunion wage advantage for an occupation at an institution may depend upon 
the fraction of the other staff occupations at an institution that are covered by collective 
bargaining agreements. Hence the wages any given staff occupation at an academic 
institution may depend upon the unionization of all staff occupations at the institution. 
 We attempted to reestimate the models underlying table 4, adding as an additional 
explanatory variable the fraction of all 9 occupations that were covered by collective 
 8
bargaining agreements.12 Unfortunately, when 1 of the 9 occupations was covered by a 
contract, the vast majority of the other occupations also were covered by a contract. 
Hence the coverage by union contract variable for an occupation was very highly 
correlated with the fraction of the 9 occupations at the institution that were covered by 
union contracts. The high degree of collinearity prevented us from estimating such a 
model. 
 A second way to get at this issue is simply to treat the 9 occupational salary 
equations as a single system and to allow the error terms to be correlated across 
equations. Estimating this system using the method of seemingly unrelated regressions 
will increase the efficiency of our estimates, however, as long as none of the other 
statistical assumption was violated, the estimates reported in table 4 would remain 
unbiased.13  
 The method of seemingly unrelated regressions will increase the efficiency of the 
estimated coefficients only if the identical explanatory variables do not appear in each 
equation. In our system, the only explanatory variable that varies across occupations is 
whether employees in an occupation are covered by a collective bargaining agreement at 
an institution. We have already indicated that the fraction of occupations organized at an 
institution is highly correlated with whether any one of the occupations is organized 
across institutions. Given this fact, it is not surprising that the estimated union 
coefficients that we obtained when we reestimated the model by seemingly unrelated 
regressions (these estimates found in row C of table 5); the estimated prove to be very 
similar to the coefficients found in row A of the table. Any differences are probably due 
                                                 
12 Ehrenberg and Goldstein  (1975) followed a similar procedure in their study of the impact of public 
sector unions on the wages of different occupational categories of public employees. 
13 The seemingly unrelated regression model was developed by Arnold Zellner (1962) 
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to sampling error since the seemingly unrelated regression model could only be estimated 
using data on the subset of institutions that reported occupational salary and unionization 
data for all 9 occupations. 
 Finally, our estimates of the salary advantage that staff who work in unionized 
academic environments have over staff who work in nonunion academic environments 
treats staff coverage by a collective bargaining agreement as being exogenous. If, for 
example, the institutions in which we observe staff covered by a collective bargaining 
agreement were initially the institutions in which staff compensation was lowest, other 
factors held constant, our estimates will understate the extent to which academic staff 
unions have improved their members compensation relative to the compensation of 
academic staff at institutions not covered by collective bargaining agreements. 
 In the absence of having a panel data set that would permit us to estimate how 
changes in staff salaries at academic institutions are related to changes in collective 
bargaining coverage, there are two ways to handle this problem. The first is to obtain an 
instrument for the presence of a union contract and to reestimate our basic model using 
the method of instrumental variables. We obtained an instrument for collective 
bargaining for a staff occupation at an institution by regressing this variable on all of the 
other variables found on the right hand side of the salary equations, as well the 
proportions of private and public employees in the institution’s state covered by collected 
bargaining agreements, each interacted with a dichotomous variable indicating whether 
the institution was a public or private institution.14   
                                                 
14 The latter four variables are included to allow both public and private collective bargaining coverage in 
the state to influence whether the occupation at an academic institution was covered by a collective 
bargaining agreement, but to allow the importance of each of these variables to depend upon whether the 
institution was a public or a private institution. 
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 The estimated union coverage coefficients that we obtained using this 
methodology are found in row D of table 5. All of the estimated union coefficients are 
now statistically significantly different from zero and their magnitudes have increased. 
Indeed, on balance they are now very close to the raw differences in the salaries of 
unionized and nonunionized staff in these occupations that are found in table 3. The 
implication of this result is that those academic institutions in which staff in these 
occupations have been organized were, on balance, among the lower paying academic 
institutions, other factors held constant, at the time that they were first organized 
 The second is to use the sample selection bias correction method developed by 
James Heckman (1979) and Lung-fei Lee (1978). To implement this method, we estimate 
a probit equation for union coverage in an occupation in which union coverage is 
assumed to be a function of the variables discussed above.15  The estimates of this 
equation allow us to compute an estimate of the inverse mills ratio for each observation, 
this is added as an additional explanatory variable to equation and equation (1) is then 
reestimated. Inclusion of this estimated inverse mills ratio in the model controls for the 
nonrandom nature of union coverage. 
 The estimated union coefficients that we obtained when the sample selection bias 
correction method was used are found in row E of table 5. In most cases these estimates 
prove to be very similar to the OLS estimates reported in row A. The estimated union 
coefficients for carpenters, electricians, heating and cooling technicians, painters and 
plumbers remain statistically significant and each coefficient is close to its value in the 
OLS equations. The estimated union coefficients for secretaries, groundskeepers and 
                                                 
15 A table with the estimated coefficients of the union coverage equation for each occupation is available 
from the authors upon request. 
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locksmiths are statistically insignificantly different from zero, as they were in the OLS 
estimation. While custodians’ salaries appeared to be higher when they were covered by a 
collective bargaining contract in the OLS specification, the selectivity corrected estimate 
of the effects of unions on custodians’ salaries is close to zero. 
  
V. Concluding Remarks 
 Our paper has provided an initial effort at estimating the effect of collective 
bargaining coverage on the salaries of staff members at American higher education 
institutions. When we treated collective bargaining coverage as exogenous, we obtain 
estimated union/nonunion salary differentials that are in the range of 10 to 17 percent for 
the occupations in our sample. When we remove full professor salaries from the set of 
control variables used in the model, these differentials increase by about 3 percentage 
points. When we treat collective bargaining coverage as endogenous and estimate the 
union/nonunion differential using an instrumental variable approach, the differentials rise 
to the 15 to 40 percent range, which is roughly what the unadjusted mean differences 
were in the sample in the salaries of staff covered and not covered by collective 
bargaining agreements. However, these latter estimates are a good deal higher than 
previous estimates of the impact of unions on their members’ relative salaries, either for 
the economy as a whole or for the public sector and when we instead use a sample 
selection bias model to correct for the endogenity of union coverage, estimates close to 
the OLS estimates are obtained for most occupations. 
 The limitations of our study should be kept in mind. The sample of 163 academic 
institutions used in our study is not necessarily representative of the population of over 
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3000 2- and 4-year colleges and universities in the United States. The 9 occupations 
whose salaries we analyze all relate to employees employed in the facilities division of 
America’s colleges and universities and the effects that we estimate for them are not 
necessarily representative of the effects for staff unions that one might observe for a 
wider range of college and university staff employed in other areas (for example, housing 
and dining, athletics, academic support, student services, external relations).  
 Nonetheless our study does suggest that collective bargaining coverage does 
influence staff salaries in higher education. The National Labor Relations Act governs 
collective bargaining for staff of private academic institutions, while state public 
employee bargaining laws govern collective bargaining for staff at public academic 
institutions.  While student and faculty activists on campuses around the country may 
continue to press academic institutions to pay living wages to their lower paid staff, 
including custodial staff, our findings suggest that a more direct way to achieve better 
salaries for low-paid college and university employees is to encourage them to organize 
and bargain collectively. Unlike private college and university faculty members, who are 
effectively precluded from collective bargaining at many institutions because of the 
Supreme Courts decision in the Yeshiva case, there is no such prohibition to prevent staff 
at these institutions from organizing.16 
 Our study also suggested that other factors held constant, including the proxy for 
area cost-of-living and area wage levels and collective bargaining coverage, that there is 
no evidence that more financially well-off academic institutions pay their staff higher 
salaries. Whether public pressure can be effectively brought to bear on a wider range of 
academic institutions that have the financial resources to improve their staff salaries if 
                                                 
16 See NLRB V. Yeshiva University, 944 U.S. 672 (1980) 
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they choose, as we indicated at the outset was done at Harvard and the University of 
Connecticut, is an open question. 
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Table 1 
 
Collective Bargaining Coverage of College and University Staff in 1994 
 
 
 Total Employees Estimated Employees 
in Bargaining Units 
Percent 
Represented 
White Collar 1,070,142 250,573 23.4 
Blue Collar 306,335 131,232 42.8 
Total 1,376,477 381,805 27.7 
 
Sources: Digest of Education Statistics 1994 (Washington DC: National Center for 
Education Statistics, 1994), pp. 228-229 (total employees); Directory of Staff Bargaining 
Agents in Institutions of Higher Education (New York NY: National Center for the Study 
of Collective Bargaining in Higher Education and the Professions, 1995), pp.  
(Employees in Bargaining Units)
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Table 2 
 
 
Distribution of Academic Institutions By Carnegie Category and Control in the APPA 
Sample 
 
 
 Funding  
Carnegie Private Public Total 
Associate 1 13 14 
Baccalaureate 23 3 26 
Doctoral 4 16 20 
Masters 12 42 54 
Research 7 42 49 
Total 47 116 163 
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Table 3 
 
 
Mean Occupational Salaries in 1997-98 for Employees Covered by Collective Bargaining 
Agreements and Not Covered By Collective Bargaining Agreements in the APPA 
Sample 
 
Occupation Mean Salary Without Union Mean Salary With Union (Ratio)
Administrative Secretary 21,953 26,978 (1.23) 
Custodian 16,993 22,850 (1.34) 
Grounds Keeper 18,838 26,138 (1.39) 
Carpenter 26,206 35,962 (1.37) 
Electrician 27,701 38,629 (1.39) 
Locksmith 27,243 33,463 (1.23) 
Heating and Cooling 26,576 37,600 (1.41) 
Painter 24,468 34,645 (1.42) 
Plumber 26,852 37,575 (1.40) 
 
Source: Authors’ computations from the APPA data. Only institutions that reported union 
coverage for an occupation and a salary figure for an occupation are included 
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                                                                                            Table 4 
 
Logarithm of 1997-98 Salary Equations: By Occupation a 
(Absolute value of t-statistics in parentheses) 
 
 
         Administrative
Secretary 
 Custodian Grounds
Keeper 
Carpenter Electrician Locksmith Heating and
Cooling 
Painter Plumber
Union 0.024 (0.6) 0.101 (2.7) 0.007 (0.2) 0.107 (2.3) 0.122 (2.6) 0.071 (1.5) 0.167 (3.1) 0.138 (3.0) 0.135 (2.7) 
Baccalaureate    -0.119 (1.3) -0.156 (1.9) -0.156 (1.5) -0.068 (0.7) -0.086 (0.9) -0.180 (1.8) -0.093 (0.8) -0.047 (0.4) -0.062 (0.6) 
Doctoral -0.207 (2.4) -0.277 (3.4) -0.134 (1.3) -0.089 (0.4) -0.087 (0.9) -0.254 (2.6) -0.111 (1.0) -0.038 (0.4) -0.144 (1.4) 
Masters -0.129 (1.9) -0.206 (3.1) -0.147 (1.7) -0.034 (0.4) -0.062 (0.8) -0.201 (2.4) -0.073 (0.8) -0.031 (0.4) -0.135 (1.5) 
Research -0.128 (1.6) -0.215 (2.8) -0.046 (0.5) -0.036 (0.4) -0.047 (0.5) -0.238 (2.5) -0.035 (0.3) 0.014 (0.1) -0.104 (1.1) 
LAPP -0.014 (0.8) -0.003 (0.2) -0.011 (0.6) 0.001 (0.9) -0.018 (0.9) -0.005 (0.3) 0.009 (0.4) -0.009 (0.5) -0.015 (0.8) 
LEND -0.022 (2.3) -0.006 (0.5) -0.007 (0.6) -0.016 (1.5) -0.021 (2.0) 0.002 (0.2) -0.005 (0.4) -0.009 (1.0) -0.020 (1.9) 
LSAL 0.726 (4.8) 0.423 (3.2) 0.487 (2.7) 0.285 (1.9) 0.286 (1.8) 0.305 (1.8) 0.125 (0.6) 0.479 (2.9) 0.279 (1.7) 
LTUIT 0.028 (1.1) -0.015 (0.7) -0.016 (0.5) 0.006 (0.2) -0.003 (0.1) -0.010 (0.4) -0.003 (0.1) -0.010 (0.4) -0.030 (1.1) 
LSAT -0.548 (1.8) -0.371 (0.2) 0.048 (0.1) 0.316 (1.0) 0.209 (0.6) 0.085 (0.3) -0.001 (0.1) -0.421 (1.3) 0.737 (0.3) 
LMEAN 0.744 (4.8) 1.132 (7.9) 0.962 (5.1) 0.976 (5.6) 0.962 (5.3) 0.888 (5.3) 0.973 (5.0) 0.976 (5.7) 1.002 (5.4) 
R2 0.4609 0.6616 0.5154 0.5612 0.5401 0.5277  0.5630 0.6137 0.5532 
N          143 142 125 143 145 119 120 131 139
a Also included in the model is an intercept term and dichotomous variables for non-reporting of endowment, average full professor 
salary, government appropriations per student, tuition and average SAT scores. 
 
Union  1 if the occupation was covered by a union contract, 0 if otherwise 
Baccalaureate 1 if the Carnegie category of the institution was Baccalaureate, 0 if otherwise 
Doctoral 1 if the Carnegie category of the institution was Doctoral, 0 if otherwise 
Masters 1 if the Carnegie category of the institution was Masters, 0 if otherwise 
Research 1 if the Carnegie category of the institution was Research, 0 if otherwise 
  (The omitted category was 2-year college institutions) 
LAPP interaction between a 0,1 dichotomous variable for being a public institutions and the logarithm of appropriations per 
student from state and local governments.  
LEND logarithm of endowment per student at the institution. 
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                                                                                         Table 4 continued 
 
LSAL logarithm of the average full professor salary at the institution 
LTUIT logarithm of the average tuition paid by students at the institution 
LSAT logarithm of the average75 percentile scores on the verbal and mathematics SAT test for the institution 
LMEAN logarithm of the mean salary for custodian in the city or state of the institution. 
 
 
Data Sources: Union, Baccalaureate, Doctoral, Masters, Research. Public/Private (APPA Survey) 
                       LAPP, LEND, LSAL, LTUIT (Webcaspar) 
                       LSAT (America’s Best Colleges- 1998 (Washington DC: U.S. News & World Report, 1997) 
                       LMEAN (Bureau of Labor Statistics, http://www.bls.gov/bls/blswage.htm, (2000 Metropolitan Area Occupational 
Employment and Wage Estimates)) 
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Table 5 
 
Logarithm of 1997-98 Occupational Salary Equations: Coefficients of Union Variables 
Sensitivity Analyses 
(Absolute value of t-statistics in parentheses) 
 
 
         Administrative
Secretary 
 Custodian Grounds
Keeper 
Carpenter Electrician Locksmith Heating and
Cooling 
Painter Plumber
(A) 0.024 (0.6) 0.101 (2.7) 0.007 (0.2) 0.107 (2.3) 0.122 (2.6) 0.071 (1.5) 0.167 (3.1) 0.138 (3.0) 0.135 (2.7) 
(B) 0.044 (0.9) 0.131 (2.8) 0.081 (1.1) 0.155 (2.0) 0.171 (2.2) 0.129 (1.9) 0.187 (2.5) 0.189 (2.5) 0.208 (2.7) 
(C) 0.020 (0.5) 0.072 (2.2) 0.020 (0.3) 0.099(1.6) 0.130 (2.0) 0.069 (1.3) 0.139 (2.3) 0.135 (2.3) 0.158 (2.5) 
(D) 0.196 (2.1) 0.237 (3.3) 0.195 (2.0) 0.353 (3.4) 0.417 (3.7) 0.166 (2.1) 0.270 (2.5) 0.312 (3.2) 0.359 (3.3) 
(E) -0.013 (0.3) 0.030 (0.7) -0.067 (1.3) 0.084 (1.6) 0.116 (2.2) 0.032 (0.6) 0.128 (2.3) 0.125 (2.4) 0.113 (2.2) 
Where: 
 
(A) OLS coefficients from table 4 
(B) OLS coefficients from model that excludes the logarithm of average faculty salary 
(C) Seemingly unrelated regression estimates for the model estimated in table for the sample of institutions that report data for all 
      9 occupations 
(D) Instrumental variable estimates of the model estimated in table 4 in which an instrument for the collective bargaining coverage 
       variable is obtained from regressing coverage on the proportions of public and private employees in the state covered by  
       collective bargaining agreements- each interacted with whether the institution is public or private- and all of the other right 
       hand side variables from the wage equations     
(E) Selectivity bias corrected estimates of the model estimated in table 4 
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 Appendix A 
Occupational Descriptions 
 
Occupation   Description 
Administrative Secretary Secretarial/Clerical 
Custodian   Custodial/Housekeeper 
Grounds Keeper  Groundskeeper 
Carpenter   Carpenter 
Electrician   Electrician 
Locksmith   Locksmith 
Heating and Cooling  HVAC/Controls Technician 
Painter   Painter 
Plumber   Plumber/Pipefitter 
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